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cooperation in digital evolution
Paweł Lichocki1,†, Dario Floreano1,‡ and Laurent Keller2,†‡
1Laboratory of Intelligent Systems, E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne, Station 11, 1015 Lausanne,
Switzerland
2Department of Ecology and Evolution, Biophore, University of Lausanne, Dorigny, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
A key, yet often neglected, component of digital evolution and evolutionary
models is the ‘selection method’ which assigns fitness (number of offspring)
to individuals based on their performance scores (efficiency in performing
tasks). Here, we study with formal analysis and numerical experiments
the evolution of cooperation under the five most common selection methods
(proportionate, rank, truncation-proportionate, truncation-uniform and
tournament). We consider related individuals engaging in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game where individuals can either cooperate or defect. A coopera-
tor pays a cost, whereas its partner receives a benefit, which affect their
performance scores. These performance scores are translated into fitness
by one of the five selection methods. We show that cooperation is positively
associated with the relatedness between individuals under all selection
methods. By contrast, the change in the performance benefit of cooperation
affects the populations’ average level of cooperation only under the propor-
tionate methods. We also demonstrate that the truncation and tournament
methods may introduce negative frequency-dependence and lead to the
evolution of polymorphic populations. Using the example of the evolution
of cooperation, we show that the choice of selection method, though it is
often marginalized, can considerably affect the evolutionary dynamics.1. Introduction
Researchers address evolutionary questions with various methods ranging
from mathematical models to wet-laboratory and field experiments. These
approaches are highly successful, but have limitations. For example, mathe-
matical models make simplifying assumptions about complex ecological
interactions in order to be tractable [1]. Long-term evolutionary experiments
with organisms having generation times higher than bacteria are practically
impossible [2]. Digital evolution performed in a computer has been advocated
as an alternative and promising approach to bypass such limitations [2–8]. It
operates on a finite population of individuals [9], each having a genome encod-
ing its morphology and/or behaviour. The ‘selection method’ determines on
the basis of individual performance which individuals will contribute offspring,
after mutation and/or recombination, to the next generation.
Several selection methods are commonly used in digital evolution studies.
The proportionate selection method (PSM) chooses the individuals contributing
to the next generation proportionally to their performance scores [10]. The rank
selection method (RSM) chooses a parent proportionally to the ranks (positions
in a sequence of individuals sorted ascending by the performance scores) [11].
With both PSM and RSM, any individual has a chance to contribute to the next
generation. By contrast, with the ‘truncation’ methods of selection, only a
certain fraction of the population (i.e. the best performing individuals) contrib-
utes offspring to the next generation. The truncation-proportionate selection
method (TPSM) chooses a parent proportionally to performance scores,
whereas the truncation-uniform selection method (TUSM) chooses a parent uni-
formly at random [12–16]. Finally, the tournament selection method (TSM)
forms ‘tournaments’ by sampling individuals with replacement uniformly at
random from the entire population. The genotypes of the individuals with
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Figure 1. Mean+ s.d. (in grey) number of offspring that individuals contribute
to the descending generation versus their performance scores (10 000 replicates).
Population contained 1000 individuals, each having a fixed performance scores
drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0.5 and s.d. 0.125. In each of the
11 treatments, a different selection method was used: proportionate (PSM), trun-
cation-proportionate with threshold t ¼ 0.8 (TPSM 0.8), t ¼ 0.5 (TPSM 0.5) and
t ¼ 0.2 (TPSM 0.2), truncation uniform with threshold t ¼ 0.8 (TUSM 0.8),
t ¼ 0.5 (TUSM 0.5) and t ¼ 0.2 (TUSM 0.2), and tournament with size 2
(TSM 2), 3 (TSM 3) and 5 (TSM 5). (Online version in colour.)
Table 1. Normalized pay-off matrix of linear Prisoner’s Dilemma game: (a)
without and (b) with assortative meetings. Pay-offs denote the performance
scores of the row player. Using the performance scores a given selection
method assigned ﬁtness to individuals. B is the performance beneﬁt of
cooperation, C is the performance cost of cooperation where B. C. 0, and
1  r  0 is the relatedness level (i.e. the probability that the social partner
instead of its strategy adopted the strategy of the focal individual). Note that
with r ¼ 0 pay-off matrices in (a) and (b) are identical. In the formal
analyses, we also considered a more general version of the game (see
electronic supplementary material). In the numerical experiments, we ﬁxed
C ¼ 1 and varied B from 1.1 to 5 with a step of 0.1.
cooperator defector
(a) cooperator B 0
defector B þ C C
(b) cooperator rB þ (12 r)B rB þ (12 r) . 0
defector rC þ (12 r)(B þ C) rC þ (12 r)C
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copied to the descending generation [17,18].
While all five selection methods are frequently used
to simulate differential selection (PSM in [19–32]; RSM
in [33,34]; TPSM in [35–37]; TUSM in [38–46], TSM in
[22,47,48]), the choice between them is rarely justified. More-
over, little attempt has been made to quantify the effects of
selection methods on the dynamics of the digital evolution
(but see [22,49]). This is a major issue, because each selection
method defines a different mapping between performance
scores and fitness (see the electronic supplementary material
and figure 1), thus having important implications on the
course of evolution [50–53]. To address this problem, we
investigate theoretically and with numerical experiments
how the five selection methods regulate the evolution of
cooperation. We focus on cooperation, because digital evol-
ution is especially popular in this domain [19–24,26–29,33,
38,41,47,48,54,55], and it is an important biological phenom-
enon that has attracted extensive scientific interest (see
[56–60] for reviews). We consider a population of related indi-
viduals, each having a genotype that consists of a haploid
allele encoding for cooperation or defection. The individuals
engage in a social game of Prisoner’s Dilemma [61,62] wherea cooperator pays a cost and its partner receives a benefit. In
mathematical models, the cost and benefit of cooperation
directly affect the fitness of the individuals [63,64]. We
extend this approach by considering that the cost and benefit
of cooperation affect performance scores, which are translated
into fitness by one of the five selection methods (PSM, RSM,
TPSM, TUSM and TSM). For each selection method, we ident-
ify with formal analysis the conditions in which cooperation
evolves and we experimentally quantify its level.2. Material and methods
2.1. Cooperation scenario
Individuals met each other and received performance scores equal
to the pay-offs of the normalized linear Prisoner’s Dilemma game
[61] (table 1a). A cooperator received performance score B if it met
a cooperator, and 0 if it met a defector. A defector received per-
formance score B þ C if it met a cooperator, and C if it met a
defector. In the formal analysis, we also considered a more general
version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (see the electronic sup-
plementary material). In the numerical experiments, we fixed
the performance cost of cooperation C to 1.
The meetings of individuals were assortative, i.e. with prob-
ability r, an individual met an individual of the same strategy,
and otherwise it met an individual chosen uniformly at random
from the entire population [62] (table 1b). Thus, r measured the
relatedness between individuals [65], i.e. it reflected the ‘surplus’
of probability that the social partners used the same strategy
than was expected by random.
Prisoner’s Dilemma game has been used to model the logic
of animal conflict and cooperation [61]. One example is public
goods production in bacteria where producers pay an energetic
cost to secrete an enzyme and non-producers receive a benefit
by freely absorbing it (see [66] for more examples). In this con-
text, the positive relatedness would be due to spatial structure
of the population where an individual’s performance is affected
only by neighbouring production and/or absorption of public
goods. We further elaborate on the meaning of assortative
meetings and relatedness in the Discussion.
2.2. Selection methods
With PSM, the probability of selecting the individual i is equal to
fi=
Pn
j¼1 fj, where fi is the performance score of the individual i.
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Figure 2. Mean+ s.d. cooperation level over all conditions (30 replicates).
There were 11 treatments, and in each a different selection method was used
(see caption of figure 1).
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ri=
Pn
j¼1 rj, where ri is the rank of the individual i, i.e. its position
in the sequence of all individuals sorted ascending by perform-
ance scores (individuals with the same performance score had
the same rank). With TPSM and TUSM, only the t fraction of
individuals with the highest performance scores in the popu-
lation was considered viable. Let St denote the set of viable
individuals’ indices. With TPSM, the probability of selecting
the individual i is equal to fi=
P
j[St fj if i [ St, and 0 otherwise.
With TUSM, the probability of selecting the individual i is equal
to 1=jStj if i [ St, and 0 otherwise. Finally, TSM with the tourna-
ment size s sampled with replacement s individuals uniformly at
random from the entire population, and selected the individual
with the highest performance score among the s individuals (ties
were resolved uniformly at random).
Selection methods have many biologically relevant interpret-
ations. For example, truncation selections may capture selection
by predation when individuals meeting certain criteria can
escape predators, survive and reproduce, whereas all others die
with no offspring [12]. In tournament selection, individuals
fight with each other for reproduction, a common situation in
sexual selection [67]. We further elaborate on the biological
meaning of selection methods in the Discussion.2.3. Numerical experiments
We evolved a population of 1000 individuals in 11 treatments. In
each treatment, we used a different selection method: PSM, RSM,
TPSM with truncation threshold t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2, TUSM with
truncation threshold t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2 and TSM with tournament
size s ¼ 2, 3, 5 (see figure 1 for illustration of the performance
to fitness mapping defined by each selection method). For each
treatment, we investigated 40  51 conditions, with the perform-
ance cost of cooperation C fixed to 1, the performance benefits of
cooperation B ranging between 1.1 and 5 with a step of 0.1, and
the relatedness level r ranging between 0 and 1 with a step of
0.02. For each treatment and each condition, we replicated the
numerical experiment 30 times. The values of B and r are kept
constant during an evolutionary run.2.4. Genetic architecture, selection and reproduction
Each individual had a genotype consisting of one binary allele
denoting the lack (0) or the possession (1) of the cooperative
trait. We, thus, assumed a one-to-one mapping from genotype
to phenotype. We used an on–off transition between cooperation
and defection to get clearer results on the processes regulating the
evolution of cooperation under different methods of selection.
Such a strong on–off transition may also occur in natural situ-
ations. For example, an ant worker contributes to the queen’s
wellbeing and forgoes reproduction, or lays its own eggs instead
[68]. Similarly, a single cell secretes an enzyme and pays energetic
cost, or saves energy and rides on public goods [69].
At the beginning of each evolutionary run, all 1000 individuals
had the allele set to 0. At each generation, every individual was
evaluated in the cooperation scenario and received a performance
score. To construct the descending generation, 1000 individuals
were independently selected from the entire population by a
selection method that depended on the treatment. These 1000 indi-
viduals were mutated (with probability 0.001 the value of an allele
was flipped) and then replaced all 1000 individuals from the
population. Each evolutionary run lasted for 1000 generations.
In the experiments presented in the main text, we assumed
that all individuals in the population are replaced every gener-
ation. We also performed additional experiments in which we
investigated the effects of the generational overlap by using the
Moran process [70] to update the population (see the electronic
supplementary material).2.5. Statistical analysis
For each replicate, treatment and condition, we measured the
evolved cooperation level as the proportion of cooperators in a
population averaged across generations 900–1000. To compare
the selection methods, we considered mean cooperation level
over all conditions (figure 2). To investigate the effect of the
relatedness level r, we quantified the average cooperation level
over all conditions with the same value of r (figure 3, solid
line). To investigate the effect of the performance benefit of
cooperation B, we quantified the average cooperation level over
all conditions with the same value of B (figure 3, dashed line).
Statistical significance between all treatments was determined
with the Kruskal–Wallis test (non-parametric one-way analysis
of variance) and between a pair of treatments with the Wilcoxon
test (rank sum test for equal medians).3. Results
3.1. Formal analyses
Prior to performing numerical experiments, we investigated
with formal analysis the spread of a cooperative allele in an
infinite population of individuals related at level r on average
(see the electronic supplementary material). A cooperator
paid a cost C . 0 which is subtracted from its performance
score, whereas the partner of a cooperator received a benefit
B . C which is added to its performance score. The perform-
ance scores of the individuals were translated into their
fitness values by one of the five selection methods: PSM,
RSM, TPSM, TUSM and TSM. Two of them (PSM and
RSM) do not have any free parameters. By contrast, TPSM
and TUSM are characterized by the truncation threshold t,
which determines the fraction of individuals (i.e. those with
the highest performance scores) which are viable. Finally,
TSM is characterized by the tournament size s, which indi-
cates the number of individuals that compete between each
other in randomly formed groups. Using each of the five
selection methods, we identified the conditions for evolution
of cooperation (table 2a) and defection (table 2b).
In general, we found that the conditions for evolution of
cooperation and defection depend on the frequency of coop-
erators in a population (see the electronic supplementary
material). Thus, we focused on the conditions when the
invading allele is under positive selection, assuming that
the opposite allele has reached fixation. Consequently, one
can predict when either the cooperative or the defective
allele reaches fixation, and when the two alleles coexist in
the population (table 2). In particular, cooperation reaches fix-
ation if it is under positive selection in a population of
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Figure 3. Mean+ s.d. (in grey) cooperation level over: (dashed line) all con-
ditions with the same performance benefit of cooperation B, (solid line) all
conditions with the same relatedness level r (30 replicates). The population dis-
played an average relatedness level equal to r owing to assortative meeting of
the individuals. The performance score of a cooperator was set to B if it met a coop-
erator and to 0 if it met a defector. The performance score of a defector was set to
Bþ 1 if it met a cooperator and to 1 if it met a defector. There were 11 treatments,
and in each a different selection method was used (see caption of figure 1).
Table 2. Conditions in which (a) the cooperative allele is under positive
selection assuming the defective allele has reached ﬁxation, and (b) vice versa.
Cooperation reaches ﬁxation if the condition (a) is met exclusively. Similarly,
defection reaches ﬁxation if the condition (b) is met exclusively. If both
conditions are met together, cooperation and defection coexist in the population.
r denotes the relatedness level between individuals, B is the performance beneﬁt
of cooperation and C is the performance cost of cooperation. The performance
scores of the individuals were transformed into ﬁtness by one of the ﬁve
selection methods: proportionate (PSM), rank (RSM), truncation-proportionate
with truncation threshold t (TPSM t), truncation-uniform with truncation
threshold t (TUSM t) and tournament with tournament size s (TSM s).
selection
(a) cooperation
invades defection
when
(b) defection
invades cooperation
when
PSM r. C/B r, C/B
RSM r. 1/2 r, 1/2
TPSM t r. tC/B r, 1 – tB/(B þ C )
TUSM t r. t r, 1 – t
TSM s r. 1/s r, 1 – 1/s
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population of cooperators. Similarly, defection reaches fix-
ation if it is under positive selection in a population of
cooperators, and cooperation is not under positive selection
in a population of cooperators. Finally, the population is
polymorphic if both cooperation is under positive selection
in a population of defectors, and defection is under positive
selection in a population of cooperators.
With PSM, cooperation is under positive selection in a
population of defectors when r . C/B, whereas defection is
under positive selection in a population of cooperators
when r , C/B. With TPSM, these conditions are relaxed,
and cooperation is under positive selection in a population
of defectors when r . tC/B, whereas defection is under posi-
tive selection in a population of cooperators when r, 1 – tB/
(B þ C). In contrast to PSM and TPSM, with RSM, TUSM and
TSM, the conditions for invasion of cooperation and of defec-
tion are independent of C and B. Cooperation is under
positive selection in a population of defectors when r . 1/2for RSM, r. t for TUSM, and r . 1/s for TSM. Similarly,
the defection is under positive selection in a population
of cooperators when r , 1/2 for RSM, r , 1 – t for TUSM,
and r , 1 – 1/s for TSM. All results are jointly presented
in table 2 (see the electronic supplementary material for
formal derivations and extended analyses).3.2. Numerical experiments
To verify and extend our formal analyses, we performed
numerical experiments and quantified the average cooperation
level in 30 independent populations under each of the five
selection methods. Overall, there were 11 treatments, because
we systematically investigated different values of the trunca-
tion threshold t and of the tournament size s (PSM, RSM,
TPSM t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2, TUSM t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2, TSM s ¼ 2, 3,
5). For the sake of simplicity, we fixed the performance cost
of cooperation C ¼ 1, and investigated the combined effects
of the relatedness level r and the performance benefit of
cooperation B on the cooperation level. There were significant
differences in the level of cooperation averaged across all con-
ditions between all 11 treatments (figure 2, Kruskal–Wallis
test, d.f.¼ 10, p, 0.001) and between each pair of treatments
(55 pairwise Wilcoxon tests, d.f. ¼ 29, all p, 0.001).
The performance benefit of cooperation B had different
effects on the level of cooperation depending on the selection
method used. The cooperation level increased with B in the
four treatments with PSM and TPSM t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2. By
contrast, in the five other treatments, the value of B had no
effect on the level of cooperation (figure 3, dashed line).
In all 11 treatments, the level of cooperation increased
with relatedness r (figure 3, solid line). However, there
were differences among treatments about the nature of the
transition from defection to cooperation. There was a thresh-
olding effect in the four treatments with RSM, TUSM t ¼ 0.8,
TUSM t ¼ 0.5 and TSM s ¼ 2 as the evolved populations con-
tained either defectors (for low values of r) or cooperators
(for high values of r). By contrast, in the seven other treat-
ments, the transition from defection to cooperation with the
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11 treatments, and in each a different selection method was used (see caption of figure 1). See caption of figure 3 for the explanation of the cooperative scenario.
Cooperation was always under positive selection (irrespective of the proportion of cooperators and defectors in the population) in conditions above dashed line in (a),
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level depended on combined effects of r and B (figure 4a,
PSM, TPSM t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2), and because polymorphic
populations evolved (figure 4a, TPSM t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2,
TUSM t ¼ 0.2, TSM s ¼ 3, 5).
For all treatments, the outcomes of the numerical exper-
iments were in good agreement with the predicted
conditions where cooperation should invade defection, and
vice versa (figure 4a,b). Cooperation level was low in con-
ditions where a population of defectors was predicted to be
resistant against the invasion of cooperation (figure 4a, area
below the solid line). By contrast, cooperation always went
to fixation in conditions where it was predicted to invade a
population of defectors and defection was not predicted to
invade a population of cooperators (figure 4a, area above
the dashed line). Finally, populations were polymorphic in
conditions for which both cooperation was predicted to
invade a population of defectors and defection was predic-
ted to invade a population of cooperators (figure 4a, TPSM
t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2, TUSM t ¼ 0.8, 0.5, 0.2 and TSM s ¼ 3, 5, inter-
section of the area below the dashed line and the area above
the solid line).Despite the good agreement between formal analyses
and experimental results, there were few small discrepan-
cies. In contrast to the predicted conditions for evolution of
cooperation under TUSM (i.e. r. t), cooperation evolved
when r was slightly lower than t (i.e. r ¼ 0.78 instead of
0.8 with TUSM t ¼ 0.8, and r ¼ 0.46, 0.48 instead of 0.5
with TUSM t ¼ 0.5). Similarly, in contrast to the predicted
conditions for evolution of cooperation under TSM (i.e.
r . 1/s), cooperation evolved in conditions when r was
slightly lower than 1/s (r ¼ 0.48 instead of 0.5 with TSM
s ¼ 2). These small discrepancies stem from the effects of
mutation in finite populations, which relaxed the conditions
for evolution of cooperation with TUSM and TSM (see the
electronic supplementary material).
In all 11 treatments and in all conditions, the evolved
populations were stable. The only exception was under
TPSM with t ¼ 0.2 and TUSM with t ¼ 0.2 in conditions
with r ranging between 0.25 and 0.5 (see the electronic
supplementary material). Owing to the low value of the trun-
cation threshold in these two methods of selection, the number
of parents was small in relation to the population size. Low
effective population size has been shown to suppress selection,
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
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ity of the evolved populations. Interestingly, a high level of
relatedness (r. 0.5) prevented instability of populations.
Additionally, instead of replacing the entire population
of 1000 individuals at each of the 1000 generations, we used
the Moran process [70] to replace one individual at each
of the 1000 1000 iterations. We found very good agreement
between the cooperation levels that evolved without and
with the generational overlap, for all treatments under all inves-
tigated conditions (compare the electronic supplementary
material, figure S2 and figure 4b).J.R.Soc.Interface
11:201307434. Discussion
The results show that cooperation level is positively associated
with the relatedness level, regardless of the selection method
used. This supports the long recognized view [28,52,72] that
relatedness between individuals (or, in general, any kind of posi-
tive assortment between individuals of the same type [62,73])
facilitates the evolution of cooperation. However, the results
also show that selection methods regulate the evolution of
cooperation, by strengthening or relaxing the conditions in
which cooperation could evolve. For example, a significant
level of cooperation evolved in a wide range of conditions
under TPSM and TUSM with a low truncation threshold (t¼
0.2), and under TSMwith high tournament size (s¼ 5). Because
low truncation threshold and high tournament size, both reflect
high selection pressure, this suggests that cooperation may orig-
inate more easily (i.e. with lower relatedness) in harsh
environments, or at the beginning of invasion events when the
population is not yet well adapted to the new environment.
The level of cooperation was also positively associated with
the benefits of cooperation on performance, but only under PSM
and TPSM. With the other selection methods, the value of the
performance benefit did not affect the cooperation level. This
is because, RSM, TUSMandTSM select the genomes of the indi-
viduals to the descending generation based only on the ranked
performance scores (i.e. whether one individual has a higher
performance score than the other). Thus, the effect of
cooperation on performance scores does not affect the likeli-
hood of individuals to contribute to the next generation under
RSM, TUSM and TSM, provided that the general relationship
B. C. 0 holds. Consequently, with non-PSMs all Prisoner’s
Dilemma games are equivalent for a given relatedness level,
and lead to the same evolutionary outcome. This result is con-
sistent with a previous report on a hawk–dove game played
in populations of unrelated individuals [49].
Our analyses also demonstrate that polymorphic popula-
tions evolve with TPSM, TUSM and TSM in some conditions.
In polymorphic populations, cooperation and defection
coexist simultaneously which is a sign of frequency-dependent
selection. The reproductive advantage of cooperators over
defectors depends on their proportion in the population. With
a low proportion of cooperators, they have the reproductive
advantage and increase in numbers. However, with a high pro-
portion of cooperators, they lose the reproductive advantage
and decrease in numbers. Overall, TPSM, TUSM and TSM act
in such conditions as balancing selection that stabilizes the
cooperation level at an intermediate value. Similar conclusions
were reached for cooperation evolving under selection in
ephemeral networks [74],which in fact resemble the tournament
selection method.At this point, we should discuss the relatedness level r in a
broader context. Here, r was explicitly defined as the ‘surplus’
of probability that a focal individual meets an individual
which is using the same strategy (in comparison with random
expectation). The relatedness level can also be expressed as
r ¼ covðxi; yiÞ=varðxiÞ;where xi is the strategyof the ith individ-
ual, yi is the strategy of the social partner of the ith individual
and i enumerates over all individuals in the population. Thus,
in general, rmeasures any kind of assortment between individ-
uals of the same type relative to the population’s average, an
idea already put forward by Hamilton [73], and formalized
by Queller [75]. Intuitively, the relatedness level reflects the
amount of available information about the social partner that
the evolution can take advantage of [76]. Consequently, our
results extrapolate beyond the situations in which relatedness
is strictly due to assortative meetings.
To begin with, r might reflect identity by descent [28],
i.e. an assortative meeting of level r is as if the two social part-
ners shared a recent common ancestor with probability r
(assuming that, like in this paper, individuals are haploid).
Consequently, our r is equivalent to the haploid version
of the relationship coefficient that measures the average frac-
tion of genes identical by descent, as used by Hamilton
in the landmark paper on inclusive fitness [72]. Similarly,
the simple genetic structure of our population makes the
relatedness level r equivalent to Wright’s F-statistics, i.e.
F ¼ 12 o/e ¼ r, where o ¼ 2p(1 – r)(1 – p) is the fraction of
individuals that met an individual of an opposite strategy
under assortative meetings, and e ¼ 2p(1 – p) is the fraction
of individuals that would have met an individual of an oppo-
site strategy under completely random meetings with no
assortment ( p is the proportion of cooperators in a population).
So far, we have described the relatedness r as a popu-
lation’s statistic, but mechanistic interpretations pointing to
proximate causes of positive assortment are also possible.
Then, r might be interpreted in terms of learning by imitation
where an individual mimics the behaviour of its social part-
ner with probability r [48]. Alternatively, r might be linked
to migration in viscous populations, where with probability
r an individual does not migrate (and, thus, meets an individ-
ual of the same type) and with probability 1 – r it migrates
and, thus, meets a randomly chosen individual [77].
Despite these various interpretations of positive relatedness,
wemust point out two limitations of our study. First, we did not
directly study the proximate causes of assortative meetings, as
our model dictates that they simply do happen with the given
probability r. It has been shown that different mechanisms
such as kin recognition, viscous populations and green-beard
genes facilitate the evolution of cooperation to different degrees
[78]. How these intrinsic differences between the mechanisms
interplay with the selection methods studied in this paper
remains an interesting avenue for future research. Second, we
did not consider the ultimate causes of assortative meetings, as
we did not evolve the relatedness level which was fixed across
generations. The question of how the relatedness co-evolves
with cooperation [77,79] is important and to a large degree still
open, but was outside the scope of this paper.
The remaining question is which method of selection to use
in digital evolution. The short answer is that the choice depends
on the purpose of the model. With PSM, the performance score
is equal to fitness, because fitness is linearly proportional to per-
formance scores (see the electronic supplementary material)
and because fitness is irrelevant to scaling [80]. Thus, digital
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models which usually simply use fitness values [63].
Truncation selection was proposed based on the obser-
vation that many biological processes display a thresholding
effect [12,14,13]. For example, only the rabbits with a run-
ning speed higher than a certain threshold value may escape
predators, survive and reproduce [12]. Fitness distributions
supporting the idea of truncation were observed in social
insects in the wild [81]. Overall, truncation selection methods
approximate natural selection by predation [82], when the
weakest are eliminated from the gene pool. They also resemble
to some extent a purifying selection, which removes deleterious
mutations [83]. From yet another perspective, selection with
truncation mimics competition for limited resources in highly
mobile species, such as the competition for nest sites in birds.
Finally TSM, which simulates direct competition in small
groups, resembles intrasexual selection where individuals of
the same sex directly compete between each other to repro-
duce, and unsuccessful competitors have few or no offspring
[67]. This method is also similar to selection in ephemeral net-
works (i.e. short-lasting groups in which individuals interact
and compete, which form in microbes, marine invertebrates,
annual plants and other organisms; see [74] for more details).The measurement of fitness of organisms in the wild is
difficult, and there has been considerable discussion
about how to measure fitness in natural populations and
how to represent it mathematically [80]. Our formal analyses
and numerical experiments indeed show that each of the five
commonly used selection methods regulates the evolution of
cooperation in a distinct way. The difference in outcomes
between the selection methods stems from differences in
the mapping between performance and the relative contri-
bution of genotypes to the next generation. The actual
mapping between phenotype and fitness poses a great chal-
lenge for both evolutionists and ecologists, because it likely
depends on many factors such as the nature of intra- and
interspecific competition [84]. Consequently, the choice of a
selection method, although often marginalized, is a crucial
step in the modelling process as it has important implications
on the evolutionary outcome of the investigated traits.Acknowledgements. We thank Barbara Piasecka, Steffen Wischmann,
Laurent Lehmann, Giovanni Iacca and the two anonymous reviewers
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Funding statement. This work was supported by the Swiss National
Science Foundation and an ERC advanced grant.References1. Schoener T. 2011 The newest synthesis:
understanding the interplay of evolutionary
and ecological dynamics. Science 331, 426.
(doi:10.1126/science.1193954)
2. Adami C. 2006 Digital genetics: unravelling the
genetic basis of evolution. Nat. Rev. Genet. 7,
109–118. (doi:10.1038/nrg1771)
3. Smith J. 1992 Byte-sized evolution. Nature 355,
772–773. (doi:10.1038/355772a0)
4. Wagner G, Altenberg L. 1996 Perspective:
complex adaptations and the evolution of
evolvability. Evolution 50, 967–976. (doi:10.2307/
2410639)
5. Foster J. 2001 Evolutionary computation. Nat. Rev.
Genet. 2, 428–436. (doi:10.1038/35076523)
6. DeAngelis D, Mooij W. 2005 Individual-based
modeling of ecological and evolutionary processes.
Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. 36, 147–168. (doi:10.
1146/annurev.ecolsys.36.102003.152644)
7. Floreano D, Keller L. 2010 Evolution of adaptive
behaviour in robots by means of Darwinian
selection. PLoS Biol. 8, e1000292.
8. Mitri S, Wischmann S, Floreano D, Keller L. 2012 Using
robots to understand social behaviour. Biol. Rev. 88,
31–39. (doi:10.1111/j.1469-185X.2012.00236.x)
9. Fogel D. 1994 An introduction to simulated
evolutionary optimization. IEEE Trans. Neural Netw.
5, 3–14. (doi:10.1109/72.265956)
10. Goldberg DE. 1989 Genetic algorithms in search,
optimization and machine learning. Boston, MA:
Addison Wesley.
11. Mitchell M. 1996 An introduction to genetic
algorithms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
12. Crow J et al. 1970 An introduction to population genetics
theory. New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers.13. Milkman R. 1978 Selection differentials and
selection coefficients. Genetics 88, 391.
14. Crow J, Kimura M. 1979 Efficiency of truncation
selection. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 76, 396.
15. Schlierkamp-Voosen D. 1993 Predictive models for
the breeder genetic algorithm. Evol. Comput. 1,
25–49. (doi:10.1162/evco.1993.1.1.25)
16. Back T. 1994 Selective pressure in evolutionary
algorithms: a characterization of selection
mechanisms. In Evolutionary computation, 1994.
Proc. First IEEE Conf. IEEE World Congress on
Computational Intelligence, Orlando, FL, 27–29 June
1994, pp. 57–62. IEEE.
17. Blickle T, Thiele L. 1995 A mathematical analysis of
tournament selection. In Proc. Sixth Int. Conf.
Genetic Algorithms, Pittsburgh, PA, 15–19 July
1005, pp. 9–16. Burlington, MA: Morgan
Kaufmann.
18. Goldberg D, Deb K. 1991 A comparative analysis of
selection schemes used in genetic algorithms, pp. 69–
93. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
19. Meuleau N, Lattaud C. 1996 The artificial evolution
of cooperation. In Artificial evolution, vol. 1063 of
Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pp. 159–180.
Berlin, Germany: Springer.
20. Agah A, Bekey G. 1997 Phylogenetic and
ontogenetic learning in a colony of interacting
robots. Auton. Robots 4, 85–100. (doi:10.1023/
A:1008811203902)
21. Bowles S, Gintis H. 2004 The evolution of strong
reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous
populations. Theor. Popul. Biol. 65, 17–28.
(doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001)
22. Hauert C, Doebeli M. 2004 Spatial structure often
inhibits the evolution of cooperation in thesnowdrift game. Nature 428, 643–646.
(doi:10.1038/nature02360)
23. Leimar O, Hammerstein P. 2001 Evolution of
cooperation through indirect reciprocity. Proc. R.
Soc. Lond. B 268, 745–753. (doi:10.1098/rspb.
2000.1573)
24. Ward CR, Gobet F, Kendall G. 2001 Evolving
collective behavior in an artificial ecology. Artif. Life
7, 191–209. (doi:10.1162/106454601753139005)
25. Marocco D, Cangelosi A, Nolfi S. 2003 The
emergence of communication in evolutionary
robots. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A 361,
2397–2421. (doi:10.1098/rsta.2003.1252)
26. Doherty D, O’Riordan C. 2007 Evolving team
behaviours in environments of varying difficulty.
Artif. Intell. Rev. 27, 223–244. (doi:10.1007/
s10462-008-9078-1)
27. Waibel M, Keller L, Floreano D. 2009 Genetic team
composition and level of selection in the evolution
of cooperation. IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput. 13,
648–660. (doi:10.1109/TEVC.2008.2011741)
28. Waibel M, Floreano D, Keller L. 2011 A quantitative test
of Hamilton’s rule for the evolution of altruism. PLoS
Biol. 9, e1000615. (doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000615)
29. Mitri S, Xavier J, Foster K. 2011 Social evolution in
multispecies biofilms. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA
108(Suppl. 2), 10 839–10 846.
30. Duarte A, Scholtens E, Weissing F. 2012 Implications
of behavioral architecture for the evolution of self-
organized division of labor. PLoS Comput. Biol. 8,
e1002430. (doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002430)
31. Goldsby H, Dornhaus A, Kerr B, Ofria C. 2012 Task-
switching costs promote the evolution of division of
labor and shifts in individuality. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci.
USA 109, 13 686–13 691.
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
J.R.Soc.Interface
11:20130743
8
 on January 3, 2014rsif.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from 32. Niv Y, Joel D, Meilijson I, Ruppin E. 2002 Evolution
of reinforcement learning in uncertain
environments: a simple explanation for complex
foraging behaviors. Adapt. Behav. 10, 5–24.
(doi:10.1177/10597123020101001)
33. Quinn M, Smith L, Mayley G, Husbands P, Quinn M,
Smith L, Mayley G, Husbands P. 2003 Evolving
controllers for a homogeneous system of physical
robots: structured cooperation with minimal
sensors. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A 361,
2321–2343. (doi:10.1098/rsta.2003.1258)
34. Wischmann S, Floreano D, Keller L. 2012 Historical
contingency affects signaling strategies and competitive
abilities in evolving populations of simulated robots.
Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 109, 864–868. (doi:10.1073/
pnas.1104267109)
35. Tarapore D, Floreano D, Keller L. 2010 Task-
dependent influence of genetic architecture and
mating frequency on division of labour in social
insect societies. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 64,
675–684. (doi:10.1007/s00265-009-0885-4)
36. Lichocki P, Tarapore D, Keller L, Floreano D. 2012
Neural networks as mechanisms to regulate division of
labor. Am. Nat. 179, 391–400. (doi:10.1086/664079)
37. Tuci E, Quinn M, Harvey I. 2002 An evolutionary
ecological approach to the study of learning
behavior using a robot-based model. Adapt. Behav.
10, 201–221. (doi:10.1177/1059712302010003004)
38. Nolfi S, Floreano D. 1998 Coevolving predator and
prey robots: do ‘arms races’ arise in artificial
evolution? Artif. Life 4, 311–335. (doi:10.1162/
106454698568620)
39. Cangelosi A, Parisi D. 1998 The emergence of a
‘language’ in an evolving population of neural
networks. Connect. Sci. 10, 83–97. (doi:10.1080/
095400998116512)
40. Cangelosi A. 2001 Evolution of communication and
language using signals, symbols, and words. IEEE Trans.
Evol. Comput. 5, 93–101. (doi:10.1109/4235.918429)
41. Baldassarre G, Nolfi S, Parisi D. 2003 Evolving
mobile robots able to display collective behaviors.
Artif. Life 9, 255–267. (doi:10.1162/106454603
322392460)
42. Waibel M, Floreano D, Magnenat S, Keller L. 2006
Division of labour and colony efficiency in social
insects: effects of interactions between genetic
architecture, colony kin structure and rate of
perturbations. Proc. R. Soc. B 273, 1815–1823.
(doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.3513)
43. Floreano D, Mitri S, Magnenat S, Keller L. 2007
Evolutionary conditions for the emergence of
communication in robots. Curr. Biol. 17, 514–519.
(doi:10.1016/j.cub.2007.01.058)
44. Mitri S, Floreano D, Keller L. 2009 The evolution of
information suppression in communicating robots
with conflicting interests. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA
106, 15 786–15 790.
45. Agogino A, Stanley K, Miikkulainen R. 2000 Online
interactive neuro-evolution. Neural Process. Lett. 11,
29–38. (doi:10.1023/A:1009615730125)
46. Kashtan N, Noor E, Alon U. 2007 Varying environments
can speed up evolution. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 104,
13711. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0611630104)47. Huberman B, Glance N. 1993 Evolutionary games
and computer simulations. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA
90, 7716–7718. (doi:10.1073/pnas.90.16.7716)
48. Riolo R, Cohen M, Axelrod R. 2001 Evolution of
cooperation without reciprocity. Nature 414,
441–443. (doi:10.1038/35106555)
49. Ficici S, Melnik O, Pollack J. 2005 A game-theoretic
and dynamical-systems analysis of selection
methods in coevolution. IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput. 9,
580–602. (doi:10.1109/TEVC.2005.856203)
50. Gillespie J. 1975 Natural selection for within-
generation variance in offspring number II. Discrete
haploid models. Genetics 81, 403–413.
51. Gillespie J. 1977 Natural selection for variances in
offspring numbers: a new evolutionary principle.
Am. Nat. 111, 1010–1014. (doi:10.1086/283230)
52. Lehmann L, Balloux F. 2007 Natural selection on
fecundity variance in subdivided populations: kin
selection meets bet hedging. Genetics 176,
361–377. (doi:10.1534/genetics.106.066910)
53. Rice S. 2008 A stochastic version of the price
equation reveals the interplay of deterministic and
stochastic processes in evolution. BMC Evol. Biol. 8,
262. (doi:10.1186/1471-2148-8-262)
54. Axelrod R. 1987 The evolution of strategies in the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In Genetic algorithm
and simulated annealing (ed. L Davis), pp. 32–41.
London, UK: Pitman.
55. Fogel D. 1993 Evolving behaviors in the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Evol. Comput. 1, 77–97.
(doi:10.1162/evco.1993.1.1.77)
56. Sachs J, Mueller U, Wilcox T, Bull J. 2004 The
evolution of cooperation. Q. Rev. Biol. 79, 135–160.
(doi:10.1086/383541)
57. Griffin A, West S, Buckling A. 2004 Cooperation and
competition in pathogenic bacteria. Nature 430,
1024–1027. (doi:10.1038/nature02744)
58. Robinson G, Grozinger C, Whitfield C. 2005
Sociogenomics: social life in molecular terms. Nat.
Rev. Genet. 6, 257–270. (doi:10.1038/nrg1575)
59. West S, Griffin A, Gardner A, Diggle S. 2006
Social evolution theory for microorganisms. Nat.
Rev. Microbiol. 4, 597–607. (doi:10.1038/
nrmicro1461)
60. Lehmann L, Keller L. 2006 The evolution of
cooperation and altruism—a general framework
and a classification of models. .J. Evol. Biol. 19,
1365–1376. (doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2006.01119.x)
61. Smith JM, Price GR. 1973 The logic of animal
conflict. Nature 246, 15–18. (doi:10.1038/
246015a0)
62. Eshel I, Cavalli-Sforza L. 1982 Assortment of encounters
and evolution of cooperativeness. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci.
USA 79, 1331. (doi:10.1073/pnas.79.4.1331)
63. Rice S. 2004 Evolutionary theory: mathematical and
conceptual foundations. Sunderland, MA: Sinauers
Associate, Inc.
64. Nowak M. 2006 Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the
equations of life. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
65. Zhang F, Hui C. 2011 Eco-evolutionary feedback and
the invasion of cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
games. PLoS ONE 6, e27523.66. Doebeli M, Hauert C. 2005 Models of cooperation
based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift
game. Ecol. Lett. 8, 748–766. (doi:10.1111/j.1461-
0248.2005.00773.x)
67. Darwin C. 1859 On the origin of species, 1st edn,
ch. 4, p. 88. London, UK: John Murray.
68. Wilson E et al. 1971 The insect societies. Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
69. Greig D, Travisano M. 2004 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
and polymorphism in yeast SUC genes. Proc. R. Soc.
Lond. B 271(Suppl. 3), S25–S26. (doi:10.1098/rsbl.
2003.0083)
70. Moran PAP et al. 1962 The statistical processes of
evolutionary theory. In The statistical processes of
evolutionary theory. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
71. Lieberman E, Hauert C, Nowak M. 2005 Evolutionary
dynamics on graphs. Nature 433, 312–316.
(doi:10.1038/nature03204)
72. Hamilton W. 1964 The genetical evolution of social
behaviour I þ II. J. Theor. Biol. 7, 1–52. (doi:10.
1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4)
73. Hamilton WD. 1971 Selection of selfish and altruistic
behaviour in some extreme models. In Man and beast:
comparative social behavior pp. 59–91. Washington,
DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
74. Godfrey-Smith P, Kerr B. 2009 Selection in
ephemeral networks. Am. Nat. 174, 906–911.
(doi:10.1086/646605)
75. Queller D. 1985 Kinship, reciprocity and synergism
in the evolution of social behaviour. Nature 318,
366–367. (doi:10.1038/318366a0)
76. Iliopoulos D, Hintze A, Adami C. 2010 Critical dynamics
in the evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma. PLoS Comput. Biol. 6, e1000948.
(doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000948)
77. Taylor P. 1992 Altruism in viscous populations: an
inclusive fitness model. Evol. Ecol. 6, 352–356.
(doi:10.1007/BF02270971)
78. Clune J, Goldsby H, Ofria C, Pennock R. 2011
Selective pressures for accurate altruism targeting:
evidence from digital evolution for difficult-to-test
aspects of inclusive fitness theory. Proc. R. Soc. B
278, 666–674. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.1557)
79. Powers ST, Penn AS, Watson RA. 2011 The concurrent
evolution of cooperation and the population structures
that support it. Evolution 65, 1527–1543. (doi:10.
1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01250.x)
80. Wagner G. 2010 The measurement theory of fitness.
Evolution 64, 1358–1376.
81. Rodriguez-Munoz R, Bretman A, Slate J, Walling C,
Tregenza T. 2010 Natural and sexual selection in a
wild insect population. Science 328, 1269–1272.
(doi:10.1126/science.1188102)
82. Genovart M, Negre N, Tavecchia G, Bistuer A, Parpal L,
Oro D. 2010 The young, theweak and the sick: evidence
of natural selection by predation. PLoS ONE 5, e9774.
(doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009774)
83. Hurst L. 2009 Genetics and the understanding of
selection. Nat. Rev. Genet. 10, 83–93. (doi:10.1038/
nrg2506)
84. Ferriere R, Michod R. 2011 Inclusive fitness in
evolution. Nature 471, E6–E8. (doi:10.1038/
nature09834)
